I. INTRODUCTION
T HE present state of administrative law allows for members of the public to be the subject of arbitrary governmental enforcement proceedings based on regulations that are promulgated by an unelected and semiaccountable government bureaucracy. Many of these rules are of a nonlegislative nature, issued without advance notice to the public or public participation. There is no clear authority to facially challenge the legality of these rules through the ability to petition. Even if Article III review is available, the federal courts apply inconsistent standards of review.
Federal lawmaking must be based on congressional enactments or administrative interpretations of congressional enactments. 1 The Administrative Procedure Act (APA) provides general authorization for administrative agencies to promulgate legally binding regulations. 2 To ensure that individuals remain able to participate in the legislative process when Congress delegates lawmaking authority to agencies, the APA requires that agencies follow specific procedures when issuing legally binding rules, including publication of any proposed rule, opportunity for public comment on the rule, and publication of the rule prior to its effective date. 3 This same mandate, however, exempts agencies' "interpretative rules, general statements of policy, and rules of agency organization, procedure, 
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VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 61: p. 759 [and] practice" (collectively, nonlegislative rules) from these public participation procedures. 4 Although nonlegislative rules are exempt from these requirements because they do not carry "the force of law," 5 agencies nonetheless tend to promulgate nonlegislative rules that are of a legislative nature that impart legal duties and impose legal consequences on individuals. 6 This agency practice is antithetical to the system of representative government and leaves individuals with no opportunity to participate in the promulgation of binding regulations. The problem is exacerbated upon considering the quantity of regulations federal administrative agencies promulgate, how agencies are increasingly choosing to issue nonlegislative rules over legislative rules, and the fact that the Supreme Court has signaled a willingness to apply Chevron deference to longstanding nonlegislative rules. 7 A curative, yet underutilized, salve for this agency behavior lies in the petitioning provision of APA § 553(e) (the Petition Provision or § 553(e)), which requires agencies to give individuals "the right to petition [the agency] for the issuance, amendment, or repeal of a rule." 8 While the law is well tread on the point that agencies must permit interested persons to submit petitions regarding legislative rules, courts and commentators disagree as to whether agencies must accept and adjudicate petitions for nonlegislative rules from the regulated public. 9 There is no consensus regarding which procedures, if any, an agency must follow when it receives a petition either for legislative or nonlegislative rulemaking under § 553(e). If agencies are either not required to accept petitions regarding nonlegislative rules or may elect to simply ignore or perpetually delay adjudicating such petitions, the outcome would be a regulatory system where agencies could promulgate rules, even those with the force of law, without public participation. The negative effect of this repetitious scenario is amplified by the fact that there is no clear right of judicial review of certain agency actions regarding petitions. Even when such review is available, the federal courts employ inconsistent standards to evaluate both agency inaction and unreasonable delay in adjudicating a petition. This was not the intention of the Framers of the Constitution or the drafters of the APA, both of whom envisioned a system where the public should participate in crafting federal law, and where the courts should be the final arbiter of the legality of those laws.
This Article examines three aspects of the APA's Petition Provision. First, it analyzes how agencies can effectively prevent the public from playing any role in the promulgation of nonlegislative administrative rules. It explains that the language, structure, context, and legislative history of § 553(e) uniformly provide that individuals must be permitted to petition administrative agencies for the enactment, amendment, or repeal of all informal rules of both a legislative and nonlegislative nature.
Next, it analyzes how agencies vary in their handling of § 553(e) petitions, frustrating the goal of encouraging procedural uniformity in agency rulemaking. 10 It argues that Congress intended that agencies would con- Critics suggest that adopting these suggestions will divert scarce resources from important agency goals, 11 lead to the issuance of irrational rules that are lacking, and sometimes even at odds with, expert knowledge, 12 and increase the likelihood of "industry capture" of agencies. 13 Yet, there is no evidence that permitting nonlegislative rulemaking petitions or requiring agencies to respond to petitions will significantly increase the number of petitions received by agencies. There is similarly no evidence to suggest that petition-initiated rules tend to address any less important issues than those initiated by agencies. At least one study on the effects of regulatory capture suggests that capture is not as common or likely as it once was thought. 14 13. See Bull, supra note 11, at 287; see also Biber & Brosi, supra note 11, at 331 (" [T] he scholarly literature portrays a well-intentioned public participation toolthe petition-as easily manipulated to undermine the very regulatory programs that it was intended to benefit.").
14. Rather, one study provided evidence that individual participation either had no effect or had very little effect on agency priorities, the quality of rules issued, or the occurrence of agency capture. See Biber & Brosi, supra note 11, at ters that they had previously abdicated. 15 Accordingly, there is either no evidence to support these criticisms, or there is countervailing evidence suggesting that they are unfounded. 16 The dramatic growth of administrative agencies and the increase in rulemaking is, in part, a response to an increasingly complex set of problems. 17 In light of the expansion of administrative power, it is acutely important for the public to have a say in the rules that agencies are producing, and to have a reasonable means of seeking facial redress of such rules and the procedures used to promulgate them. The Constitution and the APA amply demonstrate the value that the Framers and Congress respectively placed on public participation in the creation of federal law and the role of the judiciary in reviewing federal law. 18 Because nonlegislative 364 (analyzing rules promulgated by U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service and surmising that "there is no reason to conclude that widespread use of petitions will necessarily result in diverting an agency fundamentally from a rational or systematic agenda-setting process-even when the process is dominated by one particular viewpoint or 'special interest' "). The study noted that petitions seemed even better at identifying at-risk species that would cost little to restore. 
II. THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT AND RULEMAKING
The Petition Provision of the APA, § 553(e), was intended to assuage at least two of Congress's main concerns during the pre-1946 administrative state. 20 For that reason, it is important to examine the conditions and concerns that led Congress (among others) to pursue sweeping regulatory reform. The APA has been referred to as the "bill of rights for the new regulatory state." 21 It set the rules for interactions among agencies, individuals, and courts in the regulatory arena. 22 A durable statute, it has seldom been revised, receiving only three substantial amendments since its enactment. 23 The statute was the legislative outcome of the "nation's decifinal rule does, as a practical matter, compensate for the absence of political checks that are a central feature of the legislative process.").
19 36 contained two proposed bills. 37 The liberal majority bill sought to impose minimal restraints on agencies, while the conservative minority proposal contained a comprehensive "Code of Standards of Fair Administrative Procedure" and sought to impose stringent limits on agencies. 38 Even after publication of the Attorney General's Final Report, Congress did not enact comprehensive administrative procedure reform for some years, instead choosing to focus efforts on the ongoing war. 39 World War II played a large role in the eventual enactment of the APA. To manage the war effort properly, agencies were given "broad new powers" and "increased authority," 40 but no central rules placed any checks on the agencies' new powers. As the political influence of Democrats diminished and the war abroad became the President's main focus, President Roosevelt relented on his New Deal policies to "'ensure industrialists' cooperation' in the war effort." 41 In debates concerning reform, Congress acknowledged that the federal courts would be afforded broad flexibility in interpreting any eventual legislation. 46 Because legislative history regarding administrative reform was scarce, 47 various groups attempted to "create" legislative history by compiling a record for courts to interpret the statute, sometimes causing various reports to suggest alternative interpretations of the same provision. 48 
B. The Building Blocks of APA Legislative and Nonlegislative Rulemaking and the Petition Provision
The contemporary APA contains two major parts: § § 551 through 559, outlining general "agency procedures," and § § 701 through 706, "dealing in general with judicial review" of agency action. 54 Sections 551 through 559 are divided into two categories, rulemaking and adjudication. 55 Rulemaking is defined as the "agency process for formulating, amending, or repealing a rule," 56 and a rule is "the whole or a part of an agency statement of general or particular applicability and future effect designed to implement, interpret, or prescribe law or policy or describing the organization, procedure, or practice requirements of an agency." 57 Agency rules have a similar legal effect as congressionally-enacted statutes. 58 While specific types of rulemaking procedures are not explicitly delineated in the APA, courts have construed the APA as providing proce- 58. See ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE SOURCEBOOK, supra note 23, at 2-3 (stating rulemaking "regulates the future conduct of persons, through formulation and issuance of an agency statement designed to implement, interpret, or prescribe law or policy," and that "[i]t is essentially legislative in nature"); see also Morrison, supra dures for two separate types of rulemaking, generally referred to in the case law and literature as legislative and nonlegislative rulemaking. 59 In addition to the delineation between legislative and nonlegislative rulemaking, the APA provides for two types of legislative rulemaking, formal and informal. 60 Formal rulemaking is a rarely used and largely defunct method of agency statutory interpretation; under APA § 553(c), when an agency rule is "required by statute to be made on the record after opportunity for an agency hearing, sections 556 and 557 [ ] apply [,] " and a rulemaking is considered to be formal. 61 It involves a "trial-type hearing" where agencies and adverse parties introduce evidence and conduct oral examinations. 62 Until the late 1970s, agencies assumed that they must conduct most, if not all, rulemakings via these formal procedures. 63 However, formal rulemaking was less than ideal. Generating formal rules was costly and inefficient, and formal agency rules were often unclear or contradictory. 64 Moreover, agency goals became dependent upon rules generally applicable to the public at large, rather than rules that were applicable only to the parties involved in a particular formal rulemaking proceeding. 65 In 1973, note 18, at 89 ("Like a statute, once a rule is in place, it must be obeyed unless a court overturns it or the agency revokes it."). 63. See Rakoff, supra note 6, at 163 (noting that for this reason, "[d]uring the 1950s and 1960s, most major regulation took place through formal adjudicatory proceedings").
64. See id. (stating "[t]he reality was that agencies refrained from making rules they would have to justify with trial-type proof," and that "the law that could be extracted from agency decisions often proved to be vague or contradictory").
65. See id. at 163.
the Supreme Court held in United States v. Florida East Coast Railway Co. 66 that the ICC's view that its authorizing statute required it to issue all regulations through formal rulemaking was incorrect. 67 The Court concluded that the informal rulemaking procedures of § 553 applied to the ICC. 68 This same interpretation has been extended to most agencies, thus signaling the dominance of informal rulemaking. 69 Informal rulemaking does not require the type of courtroom-style adjudications associated with formal rulemaking. 70 As noted above, the APA implicitly creates two types of informal rules: legislative and nonlegislative. 71 Legislative informal rules refer to those agency promulgations that are intended to have "the force and effect of law" 72 and require public "notice and comment" procedures. 73 Nonlegislative informal rules, which generally include agencies' "interpretive rules, general statements of policy, or rules of agency organization, procedure, or practice," 74 are not supposed to carry any force of law, 75 and are exempted from public notice and comment procedures. 76 With regard to informal legislative rulemaking, APA § 553(a) exempts certain subjects, including "military and foreign affairs function[s]" and agency personnel decisions, from its requirements. 77 Subsection (b) provides that a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) must be published in the Federal Register, and that the NPRM must describe when and where the rulemaking proceedings will take place, the "legal authority under which a (2015) ("Because an agency is not required to use notice-and-comment procedures to issue an initial interpretive rule, it is also not required to use those procedures when it amends or repeals that interpretive rule.").
77. See 5 U.S.C. § § 553(a)(1)-(2) ("This section applies, according to the provisions thereof, except to the extent that there is involved [:] (1) a military or foreign affairs function of the United States; or (2) a matter relating to agency management or personnel or to public property, loans, grants, benefits, or contracts.").
rule is proposed . . . and either the substance of the proposed rule or a description of the substance and issues involved." 78 Section 553(b) also lists two scenarios when the procedures prescribed in subsection (b) will not apply. 79 An NPRM is not required before an agency adopts nonlegislative rules. 80 Section 553(b)'s exception for nonlegislative rules forms the basis for the distinction between legislative informal rulemaking and nonlegislative informal rulemaking. 81 Section 553(c) provides that after an agency issues an NPRM, the agency must provide "interested persons an opportunity to participate in the rule making through [the] submission of written data, views, or arguments." 82 This section creates the public comment period for proposed legislative rules and, when combined with § 553(b)'s requirement of an NPRM, forms what is known as "notice and comment rulemaking." 83 Section 553(c)'s language is generally interpreted to exclude nonlegislative rules from the notice and comment requirement because an NPRM is not required for these types of rules by subsection (b). 84 Cir. 1987 ) (Starr, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("In a sense, notice-and-comment procedures serve as a Congressionally mandated proxy for the procedures which Congress itself employs in fashioning its 'rules,' as it were, thereby insuring that agency 'rules' are also carefully crafted . . . .").
84. See 1947 AG'S MANUAL, supra note 48, at 28 (stating subsections (a) and (c) "must be read together because the procedural requirements of subsection [(c)] apply only where notice is required by subsection (a)"); Seidenfeld, supra note 9, at 371 n.212 (" [T] here is a consensus that the comment requirement in subsection (c) does not apply to such [guidance] documents."). Note that subsection 4(b) of the public law referred to in the Attorney General's Manual corresponds to subsection 553(c) of the APA.
85. Section 553(d) provides that agencies must publish any "substantive rule" at least thirty days prior to it becoming effective. 87 In addition, subsection (d) excludes from its coverage "interpretative rules and statements of policy." 88 Accordingly, nonlegislative rules need not be published prior to going into effect. Thus, APA § 553(b) provides the distinction between informal legislative rulemaking and nonlegislative rulemaking, also known as interpretive/interpretative, procedural, or policy statements. 89 The procedural requirements of § 553, including publication of an NPRM, a public notice and comment period, and publication of a rule at least thirty days prior to its effective date, do not apply to agencies' nonlegislative rules. 90 Determining whether a prospective rule is a substantive legislative rule subject to § 553's procedural requirements, or a nonlegislative rule exempt from those requirements, can be a difficult task for courts and agencies alike. 91 While legislative rules are considered legally binding on persons, a violation of which can subject an individual to "civil or criminal penalties," 92 nonlegislative rules are not considered legally binding in that they do not impose legal obligations on individuals. 93 Nonlegislative rules "function largely as guidance documents," providing the public, agency personnel, and courts with an idea of how a certain law "should be interpreted." 94 They can also specify how the agency "intends . . . to exercise 2014) ("An agency action that purports to impose legally binding obligations or prohibitions on regulated parties-and that would be the basis for an enforcement action for violations of those obligations or requirements-is a legislative rule."); Seidenfeld, supra note 9, at 334 (" [A] [legislative] rule is a mandate by the government with which entities subject to the rule are commanded to comply, often upon threat of sanction.").
93. See Nat'l Mining Ass'n, 758 F.3d at 252 ("[A]gency action that merely interprets a prior statute or regulation, and does not itself purport to impose new obligations or prohibitions or requirements on regulated parties, is an interpretive rule."); Funk, supra note 92, at 1322; Funk, supra note 5, at 659. But see Rakoff, supra note 6, at 167 ("If an agency, without promulgating a nominally-legally-binding regulation, generates a set of detailed guidelines for its inspectors to enforce, it in effect still establishes the law for all those unwilling to pay the expense, or suffer the ill-will of challenging the agency in court.").
94. [the] discretion" afforded to it by a statute or other substantive rule. 95 Very little is required for an agency to adopt a nonlegislative rule, to the point where there may be no notice to or "input" from the public. 96 The APA requires only that agencies publish nonlegislative rules in the Federal Register upon promulgation. 97 Nonlegislative rules may carry more legal force and effect than in the past because in practice they have evolved into a mechanism for agencies to more quickly and easily promulgate rules that have direct legal effects on individuals. 98 The Supreme Court has even indicated a willingness to afford Chevron deference to nonlegislative rules. 99 In Barnhart v. Walton, 100 the Court concluded that "the fact that the [a]gency previously reached its interpretation through means less formal than 'notice and comment' rulemaking . . . does not automatically deprive that interpretation of the judicial deference otherwise its due." 101 Agencies promulgate vastly more nonlegislative rules than legislative rules, 102 predominantly because they are incentivized by the relative procedural simplicity and cost advantage associated with the former. 103 As a result, it is more difficult for potentially reduces an agency's burden of replying to repeated stakeholder requests for individual interpretations of particular regulations." (footnote omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
95. See Seidenfeld, supra note 9, at 334. 108 To the contrary, legislative history suggests that individual agencies were expected to prescribe procedural rules governing how to handle petitions. 109 Few agencies have specific guidelines regarding the submission, receipt, and consideration of § 553(e) petitions. 110 The phrase "interested person" has been interpreted broadly, to the point that many agencies have determined that "any person may petition" durally easier to issue guidance documents, there also may be an incentive for regulators to issue guidance documents in lieu of regulations.").
104. Agency action can be challenged in court only when specifically provided by statute, or when the action is considered "final agency action for which there is no other adequate remedy in a court. for the issuance, amendment, or repeal of a rule. 111 However, courts still require petitioners to establish standing before attempting to challenge final agency action such as a denial of a § 553(e) petition. 112 The APA does not define the word "petition," but courts have accepted oral petitions in addition to written requests under § 553(e). 113 Courts and commentators disagree about whether § 553(e)'s right to petition extends to informal legislative and nonlegislative rules, or simply to legislative rules. 114 Disagreement exists about agency obligations in handling petitions, and to what judicial recourse individuals may avail themselves when an agency either denies or unreasonably delays adjudicating a petition. 115 Even among the courts that have permitted judicial review of an agency's inaction or unreasonable delay in adjudicating a petition, the standards of review used to analyze such challenges are not conclusively established. 116 Accordingly, the APA's Petition Provision continues to perplex the regulated public, agencies, lawyers, and the courts. 114. Compare Seidenfeld, supra note 9, at 370-71 ("[T]he language and structure of § 553 in its entirety clearly indicates that § 553(e) applies to [nonlegislative rules] . . . ."), with Mendelson, supra note 9, at 439-40 ("Despite some commentators' statements that the language of the APA supplies an obvious right to file such a petition under section 553, the few courts to opine on the issue have flatly and unanimously disagreed, finding that no right to petition an agency to revise or repeal an interpretive rule or policy statement exists under current law." (footnote omitted)).
115. See infra Sections III and IV. 116. See infra Section IV. 117. Section 701, the definitional section for agency review, asserts that the APA's judicial review provisions apply, "except to the extent that [:] (1) statutes preclude judicial review; or (2) agency action is committed to agency discretion by law." See 5 U.S.C. § 701(a) (2012). Agency action is committed to agency discretion by law "where 'statutes are drawn in such broad terms that in a given case there is no law to apply. ' remedy." 120 Accordingly, if a statute does not specifically make an agency action reviewable, the action cannot be subject to judicial review unless it is considered "final." 121 Determining whether an agency action is "final" is often a difficult question. 122 Section 706 details the scope of review available for final agency actions, requiring courts to "decide all relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and statutory provisions, and determine the meaning or applicability of the terms of an agency action." 123 
III. THE PETITION PROVISION APPLIES TO LEGISLATIVE AND NONLEGISLATIVE RULES
The APA's right to petition applies to legislative and nonlegislative rules alike. Agencies must "give an interested person the right to petition 118. See 5 U.S.C. § 702 ("A person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review thereof."). The APA provides a general waiver of sovereign immunity from such suits.
An action in a court of the United States seeking relief other than money damages and stating a claim that an agency or an officer or employee thereof acted or failed to act in an official capacity or under color of legal authority shall not be dismissed nor relief therein be denied on the ground that it is against the United States or that the United States is an indispensable party.
Id.
119. 5 U.S.C. § 551 (13) [the agency] for the issuance, amendment, or repeal of a rule." 125 Some courts have appeared to suggest, and commentators have argued, that § 553(e) applies only to legislative rules. 126 However, the Petition Provision's language, structure, context, and legislative history indicate that the right to petition applies to all administrative rules. Accordingly, any interested person is entitled to petition for the issuance, amendment, or repeal of any rule.
Though the issue has been addressed infrequently and in passing, courts and commentators have yet to delve into the question of whether § 553(e) applies to nonlegislative rules. 127 Of the scarce scholarly research available regarding this question, the general view, shared by this Article's authors, concludes that § 553(e) applies to nonlegislative rules. One scholar argues that "[b]ecause guidance documents clearly are rules under the APA," § 553(e) must apply to nonlegislative rules. 128 Other scholars note that "the right to petition extends beyond traditional legislative rules with general policy effects." 129 However, another scholar indi- he APA petition process encompasses not only so-called legislative or substantive rules . . . but also procedural rules, interpretative rules and general statements of policy." (internal quotation marks omitted)); Mendelson, supra note 9, at 439-40 n.227 (and cited cases); Seidenfeld, supra note 9, at 371-72 (stating issue of whether § 553(e) applies to nonlegislative rules has not been judicially resolved); Schwartz & Revesz, supra note 111, at 12 ("[I]t seems unlikely that a court would find the APA requires any specific agency official to follow any specific procedure in considering petitions . . . .").
128. See Seidenfeld, supra note 9, at 370-71. 129. See Schwartz & Revesz, supra note 111, at 27; see also LUBBERS, supra note 33, at 73 (noting nonlegislative rules are "not exempt from section 553's petition provision"); Asimow, supra note 94, at 44 n.5 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 553(e)); Asimow, supra note 127, at 424; Gardner, supra note 127, at 21 ("Although the public may not challenge an agency's statement of policy or interpretative rule for lack of public notice and comment, individuals aggrieved by such rules [may] . . . petition the agency to reconsider or repeal its pronouncement."); Luneburg, supra note 127, at 13-14 (citing 1947 AG'S MANUAL, supra note 48, at 38) ("[T]he APA peti-cated that no right to petition for the issuance, amendment, or repeal of nonlegislative rules exists under current case law. 130 Case law on the topic is similarly scarce and often conflicting. Some cases opine or observe that § 553(e) does not apply to nonlegislative rules. 131 However, the statements in these cases are dicta, omitting any consideration of the text, structure, context, and legislative history of § 553(e). 132 Notably, the D.C. Circuit has observed in dictum, in line with the Authors' views, that § 553(e)'s right to petition applies to nonlegislative rules. 133 The court stated that, even if a nonlegislative rule were reached without notice and comment, "the interests affected would at least have tion process encompasses not only so-called 'legislative' or 'substantive' rules . . . but also procedural rules, interpretative rules and general statements of policy.").
130. 132. In Atchison, the court did not need to reach the issue of whether § 553(e) applied to nonlegislative rules because it invalidated the interpretive rule on its merits, and the court's brief discussion regarding § 553(e) was only a small part of its analysis concerning how much deference to afford interpretive rules. See Atchison, 44 F.3d at 442. With regard to United Transportation Union, the court was not even faced with a § 553(e) petition to enact, amend, or repeal a nonlegislative rule, so any such discussion was dictum. See United Transp. Union, 977 F. Supp. at 574 n.2 (discussing judicial deference afforded agencies' interpretive rules). Finally, in Nat'l Wrestling II, the D.C. Circuit affirmed Nat'l Wrestling I on other grounds, and while holding that the documents at issue in Nat'l Wrestling I did not even constitute a valid § 553(e) petition, the D.C. Circuit stated that it was "[l]eaving aside any difficulties as to whether the [rule at issue] is the type of policy subject to the APA's petition requirements." See Nat'l Wrestling II, 366 F.3d at 948; see also Seidenfeld, supra note 9, at 372 ("[N]one of these opinions considered the specific language, structure, or legislative history of the APA's treatment of guidance documents."). the opportunity to invoke subsection 553(e) of the APA to petition for a modification, an opportunity in effect to assure some agency consideration of comments." 134 A textual reading of the Petition Provision supports the notion that it applies to nonlegislative rules. Section 553(e), by its terms, applies to "rule [s] ." 135 A rule is "the whole or a part of an agency statement of general or particular applicability and future effect designed to implement, interpret, or prescribe law or policy or describing the organization, procedure, or practice requirements of an agency." 136 Nonlegislative rules squarely fit within this definition. A nonlegislative rule can certainly apply either generally or specifically, and such rules have future effect because "they provide guidance as to what the agency's views will be." 137 They either interpret law or prescribe policy in that they tell "the world how an agency construes a particular provision in an existing statute." 138 Finally, while not carrying the force of law, "valid interpretive rules are binding to the extent that they 'merely interpret' already existing legal duties." 139 Accordingly, the term "rule" in the APA refers to both legislative and nonlegislative rules. 140 While legislative history is silent on the issue, the Attorney General's Manual supports the idea that § 553(e)'s Petition Provision applies to nonlegislative rules. It states that the Petition Provision "applies not only to substantive rules but also to interpretations and statements of general policy, and to organizational and procedural rules." 141 The D.C. Circuit has noted that, except where inconsistent with the Senate Judiciary Committee's Report, the Attorney General's Manual is "entitled to some defer- Cir. 1996) ("Every governmental agency that enforces a less than crystalline statute must interpret the statute," and a nonlegislative rule can announce "the interpretation [of the statute] in advance of enforcement."); see also Asimow, supra note 94, at 44 (stating nonlegislative rules explain "to the public and to agency staff how the agency believes law should be interpreted, discretion should be exercised, or agency functions carried out"); Funk, supra note 92, at 1322 ("Nonlegislative rules can encompass a wide variety of agency pronouncements."); Morrison, supra note 18, at 89. ence" on the topic. 142 The Senate Report also indicates that § 553(e) applies to nonlegislative rules, stating that "[w]here public rule-making procedures are dispensed with, the provisions of subsections (c) and (d) [currently § 553(e)] of this section would nevertheless apply." 143 Section 553's structure also supports the notion that the Petition Provision applies to nonlegislative rules, 144 upon incorporating expressio unius est exclusio alterius. 145 Had Congress intended to exempt nonlegislative rules from the Petition Provision, it would have either included a specific exemption in § 553(e) similar to those in § (b) and § (d), or it would have included the exemption in § 553(a), which applies to the remainder of § 553. 146 Section 553(a) exempts certain matters and affairs from all remaining subsections of § 553. 147 Section 553(b) outlines the APA's notice requirements for proposed rulemaking, mandating publication in the Federal Register, but explicitly exempts nonlegislative rules. 148 Section 553(c) states that "[a]fter notice required by this section, the agency shall give interested persons an opportunity to participate in the rule making," 149 but because § 553(b) exempts nonlegislative rules from its notice requirements, § 553(c)'s provisions are similarly understood not to apply to nonlegislative rules. 150 Section 553(d) requires publication of substantive rules, but also specifically exempts nonlegislative rules. 151 Conversely, § 553(e) contains no exemptions for nonlegislative rules. 152 Thus, § 553(e) was not intended to exclude nonlegislative rules. 
IV. AGENCIES MUST ADJUDICATE EVERY PETITION FOR RULEMAKING
The APA mandates that administrative agencies must consider and respond to every petition under § 553(e). An individual's right to petition and an administrative agency's duties with respect to that petition are governed by the First Amendment, the APA, and any applicable authorizing statute for a particular agency. 153 The First Amendment provides individuals with the irreducible right to submit petitions to administrative agencies but does not confer any corresponding duty upon agencies to consider or "respond to" any petitions. 154 The First Amendment also provided the inspiration for the APA's Petition Provision, 155 though Congress did not believe that the First Amendment sufficiently protected the right to petition. Accordingly, Congress provided individuals with greater rights and protections in the APA, and conferred additional duties upon agencies. 156 
A. The First Amendment Guarantees the Right to Petition Agencies for a Redress of Grievances
The First Amendment provides, in part, that "Congress shall make no law . . . abridging . . . the right of the people . . . to petition the government for a redress of grievances." 157 Rather than as creating the right to petition for a redress of grievances, the First Amendment is viewed as prohibiting the government from "interfering" with an individual's inher- ent right to petition. 158 The First Amendment right to petition serves three main purposes: (1) "protect[ing] individuals and minority groups by giving extraordinary power to even a single individual" with the power to effect change; (2) combating "attenuated representation"; and (3) providing a mechanism for the people to "inform [those in government] about local conditions" and "needs." 159 The Supreme Court has concluded that the right to petition is not limited solely to the "redress of grievances," but "more broadly" for anything connected with the powers or duties of the government. 160 Accordingly, the Court has extended the right to petition to all departments of the federal government, including administrative agencies. 161 However, the constitutional right to petition an administrative agency for rulemaking does not carry any guarantee of agency consideration or response. 162 The Supreme Court has denied any corresponding right at least twice, 163 as has the D.C. Circuit. 164 One scholar opined that the First Amendment guarantees "little more than the right to make a clamor." 165 D.C. Circuit Judge Judith Rogers's concurring opinion in We the People Foundation, Inc. v. United States 166 cites seven law review articles for the proposition that at the time of the First Amendment's passage, it was understood to require a governmental response. 167 Judge Rogers suggests that an "interesting question" would arise should the Supreme Court again consider the question. 168 Contemporary case law holds that the First Amendment right to petition provides the irreducible minimum of protections afforded, while the APA expands upon these basic rights.
B. The APA's Expansion of the First Amendment's Right to Petition
The APA's Petition Provision was modeled after the First Amendment's guarantee. 169 While it may appear that § 553(e) simply mirrors the right protected by the First Amendment, 170 its text and legislative history strongly suggest that § 553(e) was intended to confer on individuals a right to agency consideration and response to all qualifying petitions, and therefore confer on agencies a corresponding duty to consider and respond to all petitions.
While the First Amendment presumes an inherent right to petition the government, subsection (e) requires that agencies "give" individuals a right to petition, suggesting that Congress intended to confer a greater right. 171 The Seventh Circuit noted that the "minimal procedural requirement" of a response to a petition "may be implicit in the APA's structure" in Wisconsin Electric Power Co. v. Costle. 172 The court observed that absent a corresponding right to receive a response, the right given by § 553(e) could become meaningless. 173 "A statutory outcome is absurd if it defies rationality," and courts are keen to avoid giving statutes a reading that 171. See Schwartz & Revesz, supra note 111, at 9 (stating Section 553(e) "tells agencies they must 'give' the public the right, perhaps revealing the creation of some new aspect of the right").
172 atives and within a reasonable time, each agency shall proceed to conclude a matter presented to it." 180 Section 555(e) states that "[p]rompt notice shall be given of the denial in whole or in part of a written application, petition, or other request." 181 Taken together, these statements mandate that agencies must "conclude" all matters presented to them, including petitions, "within a reasonable time," and that if the agency decides not to issue, amend, or repeal a rule, it must notify the petitioner promptly of that denial. In the petition context, the language of § 555(b) clarifies that agencies remain free to arrange their agendas and priorities as they see fit, so long as a petition is not ignored for an unreasonable time. 182 The remainder of § 555(b) requires an agency to "conclude" a petition, either by granting or denying the § 553(e) petition. 183 Accordingly, within a reasonable time, an agency must grant or deny every petition under § 553(e).
If an agency grants a petition under § 553(e) by issuing, amending, or repealing a rule, the petitioner would receive at least constructive notice through publication in the Federal Register (either thirty days before promulgating the legislative rule or upon issuance for a nonlegislative rule). 184 If the agency were to deny a petition, in whole or in part, § 555(e) explicitly requires that the agency "prompt[ly]" notify the petitioner. 185 Therefore, if the agency grants or denies a § 553(e) petition, the petitioner will receive notice. Accordingly, § 555(b) and § 555(e), in conjunction, require that agencies, within a reasonable time, consider and respond to every petition for the issuance, amendment, or repeal of a rule.
D. Contemporary Case Law Suggests a Requirement to Adjudicate Each Petition
While the Supreme Court has not ruled on the issue, various courts have held that agencies must, at a minimum, respond to every petition for rulemaking. The D.C. Circuit stated that the APA's legislative history "makes it plain that an agency must receive and respond to petitions for rulemaking." 186 A Ninth Circuit panel observed that an agency responded to a nonlegislative rulemaking petition "as it must under the Agency inaction or unreasonable delay in adjudicating a § 553(e) petition is explicitly justiciable, and courts should uniformly employ the D.C. Circuit's TRAC test in this analysis. Upon the receipt of a rulemaking petition, an agency will either grant it, delay or fail to adjudicate it, or deny it. 190 If the agency grants the petition, the petitioner will likely not seek to litigate the issue, though an adversely affected third party might. 191 In each other scenario, however, an individual's rights are not conclusively established under current law. 192 If an agency fails to adjudicate or delays unreasonably in adjudicating a petition, courts uniformly accept that the petitioner has the right to review, but there is no uniform standard of review. If an agency denies a petition, the petitioner likely lacks a right of review altogether. Such a lack of clear rights could cause the right to peti- 189. See Pfander, supra note 167, at 905 n.22 (stating that "[a]s a matter of history, most scholars agree that the right to petition includes a right to some sort of considered response" and listing number of scholars who have argued as such); see also RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 6.10 (4th ed. 2002) ("At a minimum, the right to petition for rulemaking entitles a petitioning party to a response to the merits of the petition.").
190. These agency actions are not necessarily mutually exclusive. For example, an agency may unreasonably delay and then grant or deny the petition.
191. Disagreement exists as to exactly what it means to "grant" a petition. The majority view is that a petition is granted when the agency issues an NPRM, while the minority view is that a grant "occurs only with rule adoption." See Luneburg, supra note 127, at 13. This Article rejects the majority view because it solely contemplates the granting of a legislative rule. This Article specifically argues that an agency could potentially grant a petition to enact a nonlegislative rule, which would not require an NPRM under the APA. Further, "courts can review both the termination of an ongoing rulemaking and delay in finalizing a rulemaking that was intended to respond to a petition . . . . [and] may treat the cessation of a rulemaking with more scrutiny than a straight denial of a petition." See Schwartz & Revesz, supra note 111, at 26 (footnote omitted).
192. See Bull, supra note 11, at 304 ("The case law addressing appeals of agency dispositions of petitions for rulemaking has been somewhat vague concerning the standard of review that courts will apply.").
tion to become meaningless. 193 Courts should uniformly apply the D.C. Circuit's TRAC test to resolve challenges of agency delay and inaction, and also acknowledge that denials of rulemaking petitions are not per se foreclosed from substantive review. 194 As explained above in Section III.C, § 555(b) and § 555(e), in conjunction, require that an agency adjudicate and respond to every petition within a reasonable time. 195 Section 706 gives this statutory right teeth, providing that district courts "shall [ ] compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed." 196 Accordingly, an agency's inaction or unreasonable delay in adjudicating a § 553(e) petition is explicitly justiciable under the APA.
Courts uniformly acknowledge that they have the power to compel an agency to adjudicate a petition for rulemaking. 197 In particular, the D.C. Circuit consistently signals its willingness to compel an agency to adjudicate a petition after an unreasonable delay, in an effort to correct "transparent violations of a clear duty to act." 198 Commentators note that in many cases of agency inaction, courts are hesitant to second-guess agency priorities, 199 yet judicial review remains an available remedy when agencies fail to act or delay unreasonably in adjudicating a petition.
The APA is silent as to the standard of review a court should employ when deciding claims of agency inaction or delay. 200 The APA uses the terms "reasonable time" and "unreasonably delayed," but fails to define these terms. 201 Similarly, the Supreme Court has yet to define these terms or declare a standard of review that should be employed when reviewing agency inaction or delay. 202 In the circuit courts, however, the most commonly used test is the "TRAC test," first set out by the D.C. 13, 2008) . Additionally, the Second Circuit has never cited TRAC or used it in an agency delay decision, but has rather looked to "the source of delay," analyzing "the complexity of the investigation as well as the extent to which the defendant participated in delaying the proceeding. In TRAC, the D.C. Circuit noted that while it had decided several unreasonable delay cases, it had not selected one particular test to reach those conclusions. 204 The court realized however, that these cases formed "the hexagonal contours of a standard." 205 While acknowledging that the standard "is hardly ironclad [ ] and sometimes suffers from vagueness," the TRAC court opined that it would provide "useful guidance" for courts reviewing agency inaction or delay. 206 In assessing claims of agency delay, the D.C. Circuit instructed courts to look to six factors:
(1) the time agencies take to make decisions must be governed by a rule of reason; (2) where Congress has provided a timetable or other indication of the speed with which it expects the agency to proceed in the enabling statute, that statutory scheme may supply content for this rule of reason; (3) delays that might be reasonable in the sphere of economic regulation are less tolerable when human health and welfare are at stake; (4) the court should consider the effect of expediting delayed action on agency activities of a higher or competing priority; (5) the court should also take into account the nature and extent of the interests prejudiced by delay; and (6) the court need not find any impropriety lurking behind agency lassitude in order to hold that agency action is unreasonably delayed. 207 The D.C. Circuit has provided little explanation of these factors or their relationship to one another. 208 That being said, the court has stated that the first factor is "the most important." 209 The court also explained that the third factor is not as important when most or all of the agency's docket pertains to human health and welfare. 210 As to the fourth factor, the court has hesitated to compel an agency to prioritize one particular petition, because this "simply moves all others back one space and pro-year delay was "objectively extreme." 219 However, even when a court finds that an agency has failed to act or has delayed unreasonably, it is very unlikely to force the agency to grant the petition; rather, it "typically will ask the agency for a timetable concerning when it can respond, thereby adding additional delay." 220 One critic of the TRAC Test asserts that "courts can use the TRAC analysis to support virtually any conclusion they want to reach," 221 arguing that the TRAC Test "makes no attempt to distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate causes of delay, . . . specific versus broad statutory mandates, or decisions about priorities versus substantive action," and that " [t] he analysis thus ignores the way in which delays undermine the democratic accountability of the administrative state." 222 Contrary to this criticism however, the TRAC Test focuses on the ways agency inaction and unreasonable delay undermine the democratic accountability of administrative agencies, while providing courts with a useful blueprint for evaluating agency inaction and delays. Congress did not codify the exact timeframe for an agency to respond to every type of petition concerning every subject, likely because doing so would have been unworkable and "undesirable." 223 The TRAC test fills the void of the APA's definitional omission and provides courts with the freedom to evaluate all the facts of a case. Thus, the TRAC test is a structure that can guide judicial oversight of agency delays and whether they undermine democratic accountability, or instead evince the existence of excusable delay due to administrative burden or other higher administrative priorities.
While not laid out explicitly, as with agency inaction or unreasonable delay, § 553(e) petitioners should have the right to challenge some agency denials of petitions under limited circumstances. 224 The Petition Provision's context and legislative history suggest that denials could be subject to judicial review, 225 
VI. CONCLUSION
Congress's main goals in enacting the APA included "keep[ing] the public currently informed" of agency procedure and rules, permitting "public participation in the rulemaking process," and formulating "uniform standards" of judicial review for agency action or inaction. 237 To foster some of these goals, the APA included § 553(e), which requires agencies to "give all interested person[s] the right to petition for the issuance, amendment, or repeal" of administrative rules. 238 Under the conflicting and confusing case law, disagreement exists regarding the proper scope and interpretation of the Petition Provision.
While interested persons may submit petitions for legislative rulemaking, courts and the literature disagree as to whether agencies must allow individuals to submit petitions regarding nonlegislative rules. 239 However, a variety of interpretive tools establish that the guarantee of § 553(e) covers all petitions, both legislative and nonlegislative in nature. Even when an agency accepts a petition, there is no consensus regarding which procedures, if any, an agency must follow in considering and responding. If agencies can either refuse to accept petitions regarding nonlegislative rules or indefinitely delay adjudicating petitions for either type of informal rule, they would then have the power to promulgate regulations with the force of law with no public participation or inclusion whatsoever. The Framers of the Constitution and the drafters of the APA envisioned a system where the public should participate in crafting federal law and where courts should be the final arbiters of the legality of those laws. The current system does not hold true to these sentiments.
To ensure that individuals remain able to participate in the legislative process when Congress delegates lawmaking authority to agencies, the APA mandated that agencies accept all petitions for informal rulemaking, both legislative and nonlegislative, and adjudicate each qualifying petition within a reasonable period of time. Agency inaction or unreasonable delay in adjudicating a petition is subject to judicial review, with a standard of review best elucidated by the D.C. Circuit's TRAC test. Denials of such petitions are not per se substantively unreviewable, though such review may be available only in limited circumstances.
The Constitution and the APA amply demonstrate the value that the Framers and Congress placed not only on public participation in the creation of federal law, but also the role of the judiciary in reviewing those laws and the procedures used to promulgate them. 240 Failure to uphold these 237. See 1947 AG'S MANUAL, supra note 48, at 9; see also Hunnicutt, supra note 20, at 153-54.
238. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(e) (2012). 239. For an argument that APA § 553(e) applies to both legislative and nonlegislative rules, see Seidenfeld, supra note 9. For an argument that APA § 553(e) applies only to legislative rules, see Mendelson, supra note 9.
240. See generally Morrison, supra note 18, at 92 ("APA rulemaking as supplemented by judicial review over the procedural and substantive aspects of a final
